


Plan for Implementing President Trump's Declaration





Plan for Implementing President Trump's Declaration to Open the Gates of Gaza for Voluntary Exit

Summary

After a year and five months of war, the State of Israel stands at a historic crossroads and must make immediate decisions that will drastically impact the future of the entire region.

On one hand, it can continue with the "rounds strategy" that Israel has been conducting with the Gaza Strip since 2005—an approach that effectively leaves control of the Strip in the hands of Hamas and maintains the constant threat it poses to Israeli citizens.

On the other hand, there is a one-time opportunity to take advantage of the window opened by the current U.S. administration to bring about a fundamental and long-term change in Gaza, removing the threat for generations to come.

The recent declarations by U.S. President Trump regarding comprehensive emigration from Gaza present an unprecedented opportunity, providing international legitimacy for advancing innovative solutions that fundamentally shift the balance of power in Israel's favor. This document proposes an action plan to implement President Trump's declaration, aiming to change Israel's strategic balance against Gaza specifically and terrorist organizations in general. It is written as a proposal for action, both for the Israeli government and the U.S. administration.

The past year has unequivocally demonstrated that there is a significant desire among Gaza's population to emigrate and free themselves from Hamas's grip. This is evident from the number of people who left Gaza between October 2023 and the IDF's capture of the Rafah crossing in May 2024, from the overwhelming sentiment on social media, and from public opinion polls conducted within Gaza. President Trump's statement at the press conference with Prime Minister Netanyahu was a breath of fresh air and the logical solution given the current circumstances.

This solution has the potential to extricate Israel from the endless cycle of the "rounds strategy" with Gaza, achieve the war's objectives, free Gaza's population from Hamas's rule, and strip the terrorist organization of its key assets. Moreover, such a move would have a decisive impact on regional and global geopolitical dynamics and contribute to weakening the radical Islamist axis in the Middle East.

Now, Israel's primary mission is to facilitate exit routes from Gaza—by sea, land, and air—as quickly as possible, coordinate with the U.S. administration to engage receiving countries, and prevent Hamas and other interested parties from obstructing the plan.







"When I leave this land—sooner or later—I will leave an important message:
When I have the opportunity to leave this place once, I will never regret it, and I will not fill the internet with posts of lies and hypocrisy about how much I miss it.
I will regret every minute I spent in this place, which crushes dreams and drowns young people in worries beyond their years for decades.

This place is no longer fit for living; everything here has become miserable, frustrating, and disappointing."



· · · Ahmed H Shqaqi

We want to emigrate...

Make an effort, ya Trump. We can't

hold on any longer, one of the

hardest nights of our lives."

Screenshots of social media in Arabic

The details of the implementation, along with general guidelines and execution principles, are presented in the following pages. We are confident that a few swift actions can establish an efficient and practical mechanism.

This plan will ensure the safety of Gaza's residents, significantly improve Israel's future, save countless lives, and sow international hope for growth out of devastation. Additionally, we are confident that this initiative has the potential to create a groundbreaking solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and even inspire a movement that brings innovative and unconventional solutions to long-standing conflicts worldwide.

They Want to Leave

Surveys conducted on the eve of the war among Gaza's population by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), along with an analysis of sentiments expressed in the media and on social networks by Gaza residents, indicate that a high percentage of Gaza's inhabitants wish to leave and start their lives anew in a better and quieter place, primarily to free themselves from Hamas's grip.

Hamas's oppression, the constant danger to life, daily suffering, existential hardships, the scale of casualties and injuries, the loss of property, and the widespread destruction in Gaza have led the vast majority of Gazans to realize that this place has no future. Even if the war were to end, it would take many years—if at all—before they could return to even a basic standard of living, let alone conditions that allow for dignified existence and sustainable livelihoods.

Another key factor driving the motivation to leave is the high—and in fact, nearly inevitable—likelihood of another round of fighting in the coming years.

Since Hamas's military coup and takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, Gaza has been under a naval, aerial, and land blockade by Israel. At times, Gazans were able to exit through the Rafah crossing into Egypt and continue onward, though this came at a steep price due to Egyptian corruption and middlemen who exploited their desperation to amass wealth. Various estimates suggest that hundreds of thousands of Gazans have emigrated voluntarily via this route over the years.

Reports indicate that between October 2023 and May 2024—the month when the Rafah crossing was taken over by IDF forces—at least 115,000 Gaza residents left through Rafah. According to a New York Times investigation, in order to leave via this route, Gazans had to pay exorbitant sums—around \$10,000 per person—to Egyptian-Bedouin companies that profited from the Gazan migrants, merely to allow them entry into Egypt and transport from the Rafah crossing to Al-Arish Airport in Sinai.

Exit Routes

It is important to emphasize that leaving the Gaza Strip does not depend on Egypt's consent. With a few simple actions, maritime, aerial, and land exit routes can be opened to bypass the Egyptian barrier:


1. Aerial Route – Establishing a controlled passage for Gazans to travel abroad via dedicated flights from Ben Gurion and Ramon airports (as has already happened several times over the past year).

Another option within this route is to prepare a runway at the site of the destroyed Dahaniya airport, east of Rafah. Through accelerated engineering efforts, the runway could be made suitable for passenger planes or military transport aircraft, allowing Gazans to leave under Israeli supervision (to prevent the escape of terrorists or smuggling of hostages).

2. Maritime Route – Another exit option is passenger ships departing from the ports of Ashdod, Eilat, and Haifa. This maritime route could be expanded to include direct departures from Gaza's coast—passenger landing craft could be leased to dock at Gaza's shores without the need for a formal seaport. These ferry-like vessels could transport large numbers of passengers on each trip, either taking them directly to a destination country or transferring them at sea to larger passenger ships.



3. Land Route – Transporting buses through Gaza's border crossings (Erez, Karni, Kerem Shalom, and Rafah) to Jordan via the Allenby Bridge or to Egypt via the Rafah crossing, from where they could travel directly to North-African countries or the Arabian Peninsula. This route appears to be the fastest and most efficient means of facilitating mass departures.



Securing the Exit from Gaza

To prevent the escape of terrorists or the smuggling of hostages, all the aforementioned exit routes must be accompanied by strict Israeli oversight and screening of all departing individuals.

Additionally, to manage the expected high volume of departures and to reduce Hamas's ability to prevent civilians from leaving, the IDF must establish at least seven secure screening points distributed along Gaza's borders. These checkpoints should enable thorough inspections at a rapid pace. The IDF will also be responsible for protecting the emigrating population waiting near the border crossings from violent Hamas attempts to block their departure.

It is important to note that most Gaza residents currently lack valid passports and are unable to renew them due to the dysfunction of both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Recently, appropriate solutions have been developed, and they can be issued a **laissez-passer** travel document, provided by the **UN or the United States**.

International Law

According to international law, voluntary migration is not considered deportation or forced transfer, as clearly stated in the official interpretation of the **Geneva Convention**. Based on international legal principles, Israel may encourage Gaza residents to emigrate, as long as they are given the freedom to choose, thereby not violating the **right to movement** under international law.

The current situation is that both Israel and Egypt do not allow Gazans who wish to emigrate to leave the Strip freely. This **contradicts international refugee law and international human rights law**, which obligate states to allow populations to flee war zones in order to **save their lives**.

Receiving Countries

The major question is: Where will the Gazans emigrate?

Since President Trump's initial statements on the issue, various countries have expressed opposition to accepting migrants from Gaza. At the same time, President Trump has identified possible destinations for emigration. We propose that the first countries willing to accept a **large number of migrants**, provide them with **decent living conditions**, and grant **permanent status** should receive **substantial compensation** from the U.S. and Israel to incentivize participation in the plan.

It is likely that some Gazans will prefer to emigrate to **nearby Muslim countries**, while others may seek to relocate to **advanced Western democracies**. Since this is a voluntary emigration process, **each family should have the ability to choose** their preferred destination country.

Below, we present the various countries identified as potential destinations, along with their respective absorption capacities. These estimates are based on demographic, geographic, economic, employment, and political stability factors, among other relevant considerations.



The table presents the estimated maximum absorption potential for each country. The data analysis indicates that the absorption of 1.7 million Gazans currently residing in the Gaza Strip is entirely feasible:

Receiving Country	Estimated Absorption Capacity	U.S. Interest in Assisting the Country	Benefits for the Receiving Country & U.S. Incentives
Egypt	700,000 people Current Population Size: Approx. 110 million	Maintaining Egypt as a pro-Western moderate state, securing Red Sea and Suez Canal shipping routes, preserving Israel-Egypt peace treaty	U.S. aid for regime stability, continued financial assistance, funding for Egypt's new cities, support in Nile water disputes, Red Sea security
Jordan	50,000 people Current Population Size: Approx. 11 million	Maintaining Jordan as a pro-Western moderate state, developing land trade routes between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean	Regime stability, economic boost from refugee aid (as seen with Syrian and Iraqi refugees) continued U.S. financial/ military aid, water supply solutions
Libya (East & South - Haftar-controlled)	1,000,000 people Current Population Size: Approx. 8 million	Ensuring Libya's oil and natural resources for U.S. consumption, countering radical Islam in North Africa, preventing Russian dominance	Recognition of Haftar's rule, lifting of sanctions on oil exports, reducing military threats from Russia in the Mediterranean
Western Libya (GNA-controlled)	1,000,0000 people Current Population Size: Approx. 3 million foreign workers from Egypt	Ensuring Libya's oil and natural resources for U.S. consumption, preventing Turkish dominance over the country	Recognition of the GNA government, lifting of sanctions on oil exports
Somaliland	400,000 people Current Population Size: Approx. 2.5 million	Establishing a U.S. base to protect Red Sea shipping, countering Russian influence in the Horn of Africa	Recognition as an independent state, economic investments from the U.S.
Puntland	400,000 people Current Population Size: Approx. 2.5 million	Establishing a U.S. base to protect Red Sea shipping, countering Russian influence in the Horn of Africa	Recognition as an independent state, economic investments from the U.S.







Receiving Country	Estimated Absorption Capacity	U.S. Interest in Assisting the Country	Benefits for the Receiving Country & U.S. Incentives
Indonesia	250,000 people Current Population Size: Approx. 280 million	Reducing Gaza's threat to Middle East stability, decreasing Palestinian minority presence in surrounding states	Investment in building the new capital city Nusantara on Borneo island
Chile, Colombia, and other South American countries	300,000 people Current Population Size: Chile: Approx. 19 million, Colombia: Approx. 52 million	Expanding existing Palestinian communities in these countries, promoting U.S. economic aid and investments	U.S. economic investments in development projects
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and other Gulf states	350,000 people Current Population Size: Qatar: Approx. 3 million, Kuwait: Approx. 5 million, Saudi Arabia: Approx. 37 million, UAE: Approx. 10 million	Providing blue-collar labor, humanitarian aid for medical care and rehabilitation, securing American investments and resources	Protection from Iranian influence, secured American investment flow
European Union countries	200,000 people Current Population Size: Approx. 450 million	Providing blue-collar labor, humanitarian aid for medical care and rehabilitation	Protection from Iranian influence, secured American investment flow
Canada	100,000 people Current Population Size: Approx. 40 million	Providing blue-collar labor, humanitarian aid for medical care and rehabilitation	Economic and humanitarian aid for migrant absorption



Migration Rate

Gaza residents live under a **brutal dictatorial regime** that exploits **humanitarian aid**—intended for the civilian population—for personal enrichment and to fund continued warfare. In reality, an average Gazan who is not employed by **Hamas or UNRWA** has **no source of income**, **no means of livelihood**, and **no place to live** due to the widespread destruction in the Strip.

As a result, the **daily suffering** of Gaza's population should translate into a **high migration rate**. By opening **all exit routes** proposed earlier—along with **U.S. and Israeli funding** for migrant transportation—a **departure rate of at least 150,000 people per month** could be achieved.

It is expected that during the **first quarter** of the plan's implementation, **a larger number** of migrants will leave, with the flow gradually decreasing over time.

The program's target is to complete the emigration process from Gaza within 6 to 8 months.

Personal Assistance for Migrants

Deciding to emigrate to a foreign country is not easy for the average person, but for migrants from Gaza, this would essentially be an **escape from a war zone**, necessitating **personal assistance** throughout the process.

One of the **critical conditions** for the program's success is a **commitment from receiving countries** to grant **full and permanent citizenship immediately** to every migrant. This ensures they can **start a new and better life** while also preventing the formation of a **disenfranchised minority**, which could otherwise become a source of internal unrest in the host country.

Beyond securing **citizenship status**, the program should provide:

- > Full financial coverage for departure from Gaza and transportation to the destination country
- > Temporary housing assistance for six months in the receiving country
- **> A personal financial grant** to assist in settling in

In exchange, each migrant will sign a declaration of voluntary emigration and a waiver of claims regarding forced deportation.

Additionally, every Gaza resident will be offered a **monetary incentive** for handing over **weapons, intelligence on hostages, tunnels, and Hamas military infrastructure**. At border crossing points, a safe weapons handover mechanism will be established, allowing individuals to surrender arms to the IDF in exchange for **immediate financial compensation**.

Essential Condition for Success – Immediate Closure of UNRWA and the Abolition of Palestinian Refugee Status UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, serves as a financial and educational engine for generations of Palestinians indoctrinated into terrorism and the destruction of Israel. It functions as an international mechanism to perpetuate the conflict and preserve the idea of Israel's destruction.

By defining **fourth- and fifth-generation descendants** of the **1948 war refugees** as refugees—contrary to the standard international definition of war refugees—and **preventing their resettlement** for over **75 years**, UNRWA has deliberately sustained the hope of millions of Palestinian exiles to **eliminate Israel** through their eventual return.



The emigration of Gazans and their permanent resettlement in host countries must be accompanied by the simultaneous closure of UNRWA and the revocation of Palestinian refugee status. This includes:

- > Terminating financial allowances and special services provided to refugee descendants across the Arab world
- > Granting full and equal citizenship to 1948 refugees and their descendants in the countries where they have already lived for more than 75 years—including Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Egypt, and others.

The closure of UNRWA would mark the end of the 1948 war by removing the Palestinian 'Right of Return' claim to Israel's territory and halting the international funding of anti-Israel indoctrination and terror education.

The elimination of the Palestinian 'Right of Return' would remove demographic threats to Israel, bring stability to pro-Western Arab regimes—such as Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and others—and relegate the Palestinian issue to history. This shift would pave the way for mutual recognition and coexistence between pro-Western governments and a secure, stable Israel.

Removing Gaza and the Palestinian issue from the international agenda by dismantling UNRWA and resettling the 1948 refugees is a clear strategic interest for pro-Western Arab regimes. Iran has been actively working to destabilize these regimes through:

- > Attacks on Israel
- > Inciting internal unrest
- > Supporting Palestinian terrorism
- > Strengthening Iranian proxy militias surrounding Israel

This policy shift would restore trust between the U.S. administration and moderate Arab leaders, after they were neglected by the Biden administration, which instead strengthened the growing Iranian power bloc.

Rebuilding this trust would also help prevent these nations from aligning with the Russian-Chinese-Iranian axis.

The Financial Perspective

In 2014, the estimated cost of rebuilding Gaza after Operation Protective Edge was \$3 billion. In 2021, the estimated cost of recovery from Operation Guardian of the Walls was \$500 million.

Now, **reconstruction after the Iron Swords War** is estimated by international bodies **(which lack direct access to the area)** at anywhere from \$53 billion to over \$100 billion. Various assessments suggest that reconstruction could take anywhere from **five years to several decades**.

It is clear that as long as Hamas controls Gaza, any reconstruction efforts will only serve to provide Hamas with raw materials and funding for rebuilding tunnels and rearming. Any investments made would ultimately be wasted in the next inevitable war, which Hamas will launch as soon as it feels strong enough to attack Israel again—a pattern that has repeated multiple times in recent years.

Beyond reconstruction costs, there are **ongoing humanitarian aid expenses** to sustain Gaza's population **until** its economy and job market can be rebuilt. This would require **billions of dollars** from donor nations and international organizations, given that:

- Most Gazan workers have lost their jobs
- Massive agricultural lands and factories have been destroyed
- > Public infrastructure, which provided employment, has been wiped out

On the Israeli side, the direct and indirect costs of the war are already in the hundreds of billions of shekels. The rebuilding of the IDF, the restocking of weapons and munitions, and the procurement required to expand the army will add further massive costs in the coming years.

A Cost-Effective Alternative

The U.S., the international community, and Israel can finance the resettlement and integration of Gazan migrants in host countries for far less than the cost of continuing war and repeatedly rebuilding Gaza.

This is a **one-time expenditure** that is **far more cost-effective** than a **continuous financial burden that only grows with each war**.

Estimated costs for:

- > Flights and transportation
- > Resettlement grants
- > Temporary housing subsidies for several months
- > Financial incentives for host countries

Total estimated cost: no more than \$50 billion—significantly lower than the alternative.

Military Implications

As noted, the estimated and recommended timeframe for the **complete emigration of Gaza's population is 6 to 8 months**. During this period, the **IDF must prepare strong defensive measures** to counter Hamas efforts to **disrupt the plan**, including:

- > Preventing the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza (gas, fuel, cement, goods, and raw materials) that Hamas continues to use for rearmament and military operations
- > Blocking the importation of tents, caravans, and heavy engineering equipment that were included in ceasefire agreements
- > Cutting off communication infrastructure
- > Systematically securing depopulated areas to prevent the return of civilians

Securing Cleared Areas

Each evacuated area will undergo:

- 1. Systematic searches for weapons, explosives, and tunnels
- 2. Destruction of terror infrastructure
- 3. Disconnection of water, electricity, and communication networks
- 4. Securing by IDF ground forces



If any threats to IDF forces or Israeli civilians are detected, the IDF will launch immediate and powerful strikes on the source of the threat, ensuring rapid evacuation of the area.

Protecting Migrants from Hamas Retaliation

The **IDF** will ensure the safe departure of migrants and protect them from Hamas attempts to prevent their arrival at **IDF** screening points along the borders.

It is expected that **Hamas will violently resist** large-scale emigration that is outside of its control, and it may **brutally execute** anyone suspected of attempting to leave. **The IDF must guarantee the safety of migrants and prevent Hamas from blocking their escape from the conflict zone**.

Humanitarian Protection Near Border Crossings

Near border crossings, the IDF will establish secure humanitarian zones, where food and essential supplies will be exclusively distributed. These zones will be the only locations where humanitarian aid will be made available.

Complete Evacuation and Demilitarization of Gaza

Through this process, **Gaza will undergo rapid depopulation and disarmament**. It is expected that the **hardcore ideological core** of terrorist organizations and their families **will attempt to remain in the Strip**.

Once only a few hundred thousand remain, the IDF will launch a full-scale military operation to completely conquer and cleanse the area, with all remaining individuals being legally designated as enemy combatants. At this stage, the restrictions on avoiding harm to uninvolved civilians will be almost entirely lifted.

Under these conditions, the **IDF** will be able to concentrate the remaining combatant population into limited areas and complete the takeover of the Strip within approximately two months, with minimal losses.

Additionally, the **IDF must prepare strong defensive measures along the Egyptian front** in case of any provocations.

International Perspective

The implementation of this plan **could fundamentally alter** both **regional and international geopolitical realities**.

The plan promotes a vision of:

- > Strengthening moderate Arab states in the region
- > Weakening the radical Islamist axis led by Iran
- > Significantly reducing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has traditionally impacted global stability

Below, we will briefly examine **three key aspects** of the **international implications** (among many others):

1. International Trade Routes

Gaza's **strategic geographic location** presents a **major opportunity** to establish **new international trade routes** connecting **Asia to Europe**. The Strip could serve as a **gateway to the Mediterranean** for goods and natural resources from the East.

A land transport corridor from India and the Persian Gulf through the Arabian Peninsula to southern Israel would allow the transport of goods, gas, oil, and more. This project is a top-tier strategic interest for multiple nations and has been officially endorsed by the United States, India, and Israel.

As long as **terrorism from Gaza** continues to **threaten Israel** and **fuel regional instability**, it will be impossible to **fully implement the Abraham Accords or establish this new land trade corridor**.

Additionally, the **international maritime trade route** from the **Mediterranean to the Red Sea**, passing through the **Suez Canal—just 150 km from Gaza**— is also **directly impacted** by the instability in Gaza. Hamas's influence on **Sinai and the Gulf of Aden** further disrupts security in this critical global trade passage.

2. Weakening the Radical Islamic Axis

Hamas's rule over 1.7 million people in Gaza serves as a forward operating base for Iran, the epicenter of global Shiite terrorism. At the same time, Hamas is ideologically a branch of the Sunni radical Muslim Brotherhood, a movement founded in Egypt with millions of followers in the Nile region.

Hamas's continued control over **this geostrategic location** strengthens the connection between **Iran and Egypt**, thereby threatening the relatively **moderate regime of President el-Sisi**.

By dispersing Gaza's population globally, in accordance with President Trump's vision, Hamas's power and influence across the entire region will be significantly reduced. This would directly weaken the threat to Israel from Egypt and prevent a future combined attack from Lebanon and Gaza.

3. Ending Wars

Upon taking office, **President Trump's vision** focused on **stopping wars and international chaos** caused by his predecessor's policies. His strategy emphasized **U.S. strength and cutting off support for international chaos agents**.

Ongoing global conflicts—including the **Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah war, North Korea's military buildup, the battle for African dominance, the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan, and other localized conflicts—**all have the potential to escalate into a **global war**.

A permanent solution to Gaza's terrorist threat, ensuring Israel's security and regional stability, can be achieved by:

- > Opening Gaza's gates for voluntary emigration
- Destroying Hamas

This would allow Israel to win the war decisively and shift the regional balance of power in its favor.

Additionally, the new trade corridor would create a shared economic interest between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel, strengthening long-term regional stability and boosting economic growth.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict—a longstanding source of global instability and inter-bloc struggles—would undergo a fundamental shift, potentially removing it from the international agenda as a persistent geopolitical flashpoint.

Above all, the implementation of this plan will make Israel's enemies realize that the damage they inflicted on Israel during the October 7th attack has backfired, reshaping the balance of power and permanently altering the region—exactly the opposite of what they intended.

An Israeli victory cannot mean simply achieving temporary calm until the next round of fighting. It must bring a fundamental, long-term solution.

The Israeli government must make the right decision—for the generation of victory and for future generations.

The time is now!



How Will the Future of the Middle East Look?



In Summary

This document serves as a strategic action plan to achieve the war objectives defined by the Israeli government, with an emphasis on eliminating the ongoing threat from Gaza to Israeli citizens, reshaping the regional strategic landscape, establishing long-term Israeli deterrence against both state and semi-state adversaries, neutralizing key elements of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and achieving significant financial savings.

The future of the Gaza Strip can be discussed only after the implementation of this plan.

It is crucial to reiterate that all open-source and intelligence reports indicate an overwhelming desire among the Gazan population to leave the Strip. Given the convergence of international interests and values at this moment in time, Israel's role is pivotal. In essence, Israel's primary responsibility is to enable the safe departure of Gaza's residents, ensuring that this historic, one-time opportunity for lasting regional peace is not missed.





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Golani Reconnaissance Unit veteran, Reserve Infantry Company Commander.

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Served over 200 reserve duty days in the Iron Swords War.



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MBA in Business Administration – Ariel University.

Served in AMAN (Military Intelligence) and Field Intelligence in various classified roles, with extensive operational and managerial experience.

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